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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following the remand of his case by the Idaho Supreme Court, Mr. Johnson’s
case proceeded to a second trial.  Unfortunately, like his first trial, this trial was tainted
by errors.  Prior to the start of trial, the jury pool was told, by the district court, that a
prior trial had occurred in 2006 and that following an appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court
had reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.  This instruction did
not include any statement to the jury that the prior trial should not be considered and
effectively prejudiced the entire jury panel.  After denying a request to draw a new
panel, the case proceeded as planned.  Mr. Johnson asserts that allowing the case to
be heard by members of this jury pool violated his constitutional right to a fair trial.
During the trial, Mr. Johnson made two motions for mistrial.  The lead detective
on the case, Detective Snarr, testified that he had attempted to interview Mr. Johnson.
The detective’s statement prejudicially persuaded the jury to infer guilt from
Mr. Johnson’s previous assertions of his rights.  Following defense counsel’s objection
and motion for a mistrial, the district court provided a curative instruction.  The
instruction was insufficient to cure the prejudice and increased the prejudicial nature of
the testimony.  Mr. Johnson asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion for
mistrial based on the improperly presented inference of guilt.
Additionally, the State presented the testimony of Scott Wilson, Mr. Johnson’s
former employer.  Mr. Wilson admitted to having no memory of the dates or times that
Mr. Johnson worked on the days in question.  However, he was allowed to use a report
he had created to “refresh his recollection.”  Unfortunately, the report was not disclosed
2
to defense counsel prior to Mr. Wilson producing it during his testimony, despite the fact
that it was created at the request of the State.  Mr. Johnson asserts that the district
court abused its discretion in allowing Mr. Wilson to testify when his recollection had not
actually been refreshed, that the State committed a discovery violation that prejudiced
Mr. Johnson’s ability to prepare for examination of Mr. Wilson, and that the district court
erred in denying the resulting motion for a mistrial.
Finally, Mr. Johnson asserts that the above errors amount to cumulative error.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On August 23, 2005, an Indictment was filed charging Mr. Johnson with three
counts of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen years of age.  (33691 R., pp.1-4.)1
The jury returned guilty verdicts for counts one and two and found Mr. Johnson not
guilty of count three.  (33691 R., pp.320-321.)  The district court imposed a unified
sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed, for each count, to be served
concurrently.  (33691 R., pp.343-347.)  Mr. Johnson filed a Notice of Appeal timely from
the Judgment of Conviction.  (33691 R., pp.356-358.)  The Idaho Supreme Court
vacated Mr. Johnson's convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings “due
to the district court's erroneous admission of evidence under I.R.E. 404(b).” State v.
Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 671 (2010).
Following remand, Mr. Johnson’s new trial began in June of 2011.  (R., pp.560-
564.)  Prior to the start of trial, potential jurors were called in, sworn, given preliminary
jury instructions, and asked to fill out a supplemental juror questionnaire.  (R., pp.555-
1 Citations to the prior appeal, Supreme Court Docket Number 33691, will be cited as
“33691 R.”  Citations to the record in the pending appeal will be cited as “R.”
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558; Tr. 6/22/11, p.4, L.4 – p.18, L.12; Tr. 6/23/11, p.18, L.4 – p.29, L.8.)2 During these
hearings, the district court read the following to the jury, “. . . There was a prior trial in
this case in 2006.  Following an appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the case to this court for a new trial. . . .”  (R., p.550; Tr. 6/22/11, p.5, Ls.12-
15, p.11, Ls.20-23; Tr. 6/23/11, p.19, Ls.14-17, p.25, Ls.14-16.)
At the start of trial, Mr. Johnson filed a motion in limine requesting an order from
the district court prohibiting the State from “[m]aking any reference to a prior trial in this
case” and requesting, that to the extent that witnesses need to referred to the prior trial,
that it be referred to as “a previous hearing in this case.”  (R., p.565.)  The district court
immediately informed defense counsel that the jury panel had already been told that
there was a prior trial and appeal during the hearings to have the potential jurors
complete the supplemental questionnaire.  (Tr., p.74. Ls.8-14.)  Defense counsel, who
was not present when the instruction had been given, expressed concern that the jurors
had been informed that Mr. Johnson had been previously convicted, objected, and
requested that the matter be vacated and new jury panel selected.  (Tr., p.75, Ls.13-21,
p.76, Ls.18-24, p.77, L.9, p.80, L.18 – p.81, L.16; R., pp.555-558.)  Ultimately, the
district court denied the motion to vacate and noted that if either party needed to refer to
the prior trial they should “appropriately refer to it as a prior proceeding or a prior
hearing.”  (Tr., p.82, L.20 – p.83, L.5.)
The State presented several witnesses including Dr. Barton Adrian, a doctor that
preformed an examination of A.J., the alleged victim (Tr. p.534, L.1 – p.550, L.14);
Peggy Jarolimek, a retired caseworker for health and welfare who set up a CARES
2 The transcript of the jury trial and sentencing hearing, will be cited as “Tr.”
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interview for A.J. (Tr., p.555, L.10 – p.567, L.25); Lisa Mitton, the forensic interviewer for
CARES who interviewed A.J. (Tr., p.570, L.13 – p.581, L.9); two former co-workers of
Mr. Johnson, Jeremy Kiesig (Tr., p.584, L.13 – p.602, L.21) and Tammy Lynard
(Tr., p.603, L.8 – p.613, L.20); Scott Wilson, Mr. Johnson’s former employer (Tr., p.621,
L.22 – p.701, L.18), Eric Snarr, the detective who investigated the accusations against
Mr. Johnson (Tr., p.703, L.20 – p.751, L.20), A.J., the alleged victim (Tr., p.755, L.11 –
p.802, L.11); Richard Smith, A.J.’s maternal grandfather (Tr., p.802, L.21 – p.860, L.7);
and Michelle Johnson, A.J.’s mother (Tr., p.881, L.12 – p.1049, L.6).
During the State’s case-in-chief, the defense made two motions for mistrial.  The
first occurred during the testimony of Scott Wilson, Mr. Johnson’s former employer.  The
focus of Mr. Wilson’s testimony was to provide information about certain dates that
Mr. Johnson worked near the time that he was alleged to have inappropriately touched
A.J.   Mr.  Wilson  was  asked  if  he  remembered  if  Mr.  Johnson  was  working  on  that
particular job on March 19, 2004.  (Tr., p.627, L.8 – p.628, L.6.)  He requested that he
be able to look at some notes that would refresh his memory.  (Tr., p.628, L.10, p.631,
Ls.7-9.)  Defense noted counsel they had filed a discovery request and that the report
had not been disclosed.  (Tr., p.631, Ls.12-17.)  In follow-up, Mr. Wilson admitted that
he did not remember seeing Mr. Johnson at work on either March 19, 2004, or
March 22, 2004.  (Tr., p.632, Ls.9-17.)  Defense counsel disputed the report’s ability to
refresh Mr. Wilson’s recollection.  (Tr., p.637, Ls.6-15.)  The district court noted that the
witness could “testify without the benefit of the document, because it’s very close to his
testimony being from the document itself, which is an authentication of the document,
and it’s impermissible.  It’s late disclosed discovery.  [If his recollection has been
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refreshed he can testify.]  But any further use of the document will not be permitted.”
(Tr., p.637, L.19 – p.638, L.8.)
The jury returned and Mr. Wilson was asked if his memory had been refreshed
as to Mr. Johnson’s work on March 19th; he stated it was refreshed.  (Tr., p.640, L.22 –
p.641, L.1.)  The State continued to ask him about Mr. Johnson’s work on March 19th
and then the questioning turned to March 22nd.  (Tr., p.641, Ls.2-20.)  Defense counsel
objected again noting that Mr. Wilson’s memory had not been refreshed, but that he
was testifying from his memory of the report he generated earlier in the day.  (Tr., p.641,
L.24 – p.642, L.3.)   Defense counsel was then allowed to vior dire in aid of objection
and Mr. Wilson admitted that he had no memory of the dates in question or if
Mr. Johnson was at work on those dates.  (Tr., p.643, L.14 – p.644, L.9.)  Defense
counsel again noted his objection and requested the testimony be stricken.  (Tr., p.644,
Ls.10-11.)  The district court overruled the objection.  (Tr., p.644, Ls.17-18.)  Mr. Wilson
was then allowed to testify about Mr. Johnson’s work on March 22nd.  (Tr., p.644, L.23 –
p.645, L.20.)
During a break, defense counsel reiterated that a discovery request had been
made over a year ago, no records representing the data management program used by
Trilogy were provided, Mr. Wilson has no current relocation of what happened on
March 19th or 22nd, the defense had no opportunity to review the records related to
tracking Mr. Johnson’s work, that the State was using a “backdoor approach to
introducing documentary evidence that was never disclosed to the defense,” that the
defense had “been caught in unawares,” and that the district court’s incorrect ruling
amounted reversible error.  (Tr., p.648, L.8 – p.651, L.17.)   The district court
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determined that it needed further information and had Mr. Wilson return to the witness
stand.  (Tr., p.655, L.23 – p.656, L.5.)
Eventually, after discussing the importance of Mr. Wilson’s testimony, defense
counsel made a motion for a mistrial.  (Tr., p.668, Ls.2-4.)  The district court stated that
it was “difficult, if not impossible,” to rein in Mr. Wilson’s testimony at this point.
(Tr., p.676, Ls.13-17.)  The court ruled that it would affirm the prior ruling on refreshing
recollection, “I think the State did just provide sufficient foundation to satisfy the
requirements of Rule 612 for use of that document.”  (Tr., p.676, L.18 – p.677, L.1.)
The district court also found that the failure to disclose the report constituted a discovery
violation “in form, if not in substance” because, by the witnesses testimony, the report
“was requested by either the State’s attorney or Detective Snarr.”  (Tr., p.677, Ls.3-11.)
However, the court took the motion for mistrial under advisement noting that there was
no possibility of excluding the testimony at this point and that it needed to hear further
testimony to determine if the evidence deprived Mr. Johnson of a fair trial.  (Tr., p.677,
L.18 – p.678, L.25.)
The second motion for a mistrial occurred during Detective Snarr’s testimony  He
was asked if he had interviewed anyone else after sitting through the CARES interview,
talking to Michelle Johnson, and Joann Johnson.  (Tr., p.726, Ls.17-24.)  He responded
that he “[t]ried to interview Mr. Johnson.”  (Tr., p.726, L.25.)  Defense counsel
immediately objected and moved for a mistrial.  (Tr., p.727, Ls.13-21.)   The court noted
that “as it stands at this point I’m satisfied and convinced that just the way the answer’s
phased and the words used creates an impermissible inference of guilt.”  (Tr., p.731,
Ls.20-23.)  In discussing a possible remedy to the violation of Mr. Johnson’s
7
constitutional rights, defense counsel argued for the declaration of a mistrial and against
a limiting instruction.  (Tr., p.736, Ls.15-25, p.738, Ls.20-21.)  The district court
determined that it would provide a limiting instruction and deferred ruling on the motion
for mistrial so that it could later assess whether or not Mr. Johnson had been afforded a
fair trial.  (Tr., p.737, Ls.16-25.)
After the State rested, defense counsel requested that the district court rule on
the motions for mistrial.  (Tr., p.1070, Ls.25-25, p.1084, Ls.12-13.)  The district court
ruled that:
At this point I’ve been examining the question of mistrial under the
parameters of determining whether or not the two particular events I was
focused on, which were the discovery, if you will, with the witness who
went back to Twin Falls and created a computer document, and with
respect to the testimony that could have been construed as commenting
on the defendant’s pre-arrest pre-Miranda silence, and the context was
whether or not those two items operated or might operate to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial.
In considering the evidence as it’s been presented and the
examination of all the witnesses, I think those two items have been vitiated
in terms of their effect on the defense, and so I will deny the motions for
mistrial on those bases.
(Tr., p.1084, L.14 – p.1085, L.6.)
The defense presented the testimony of Diane Peterson, Mr. Johnson’s sister
(Tr., p.1086, L.1 – p.1112, L.8); recalled Detective Snarr (Tr., p.1115, L.11 – p.1136,
L.16); and then Mr. Johnson testified on his own behalf (Tr., p.1138, L.22 – p.1201,
L.16).  Mr. Johnson specifically maintained his innocence.  (Tr., p.1153, L.21 – p.1154,
L.14, p.1156, Ls.15-20.)
Ultimately, the jury returned guilty verdicts for both counts of lewd conduct.
(Tr., p.1299, L.15 – p.1300, L.8; R., p.608.)  Mr. Johnson was sentenced to unified
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sentences of fifteen years, with five years fixed, for each of his two lewd conduct
convictions.  (R., pp.612-614.)  No Notice of Appeal was filed.  However, after a
successful post-conviction proceeding, a Superseding Judgment of Conviction and
Order of Commitment was entered to allow Mr. Johnson to appeal.  (R., pp.88-91.)  A




1. Did the district court’s instruction informing the jury pool that a prior trial had
occurred, that Mr. Johnson’s prior convictions were overturned, and that the
Idaho Supreme Court had remanded the case for a new trial violate
Mr. Johnson’s constitutional right to a fair trial before an impartial jury?
2. Did the district court err in denying the motion for a mistrial made after the State
improperly commented on Mr. Johnson’s invocation of his right to silence?
3. Did the district court err in denying the motion for a mistrial after the court
erroneously allowed Mr. Wilson to testify with the aid of a report, despite the fact
that his memory was not refreshed by the contents of the report, and after finding
that the State’s failure to disclose the report amounted to a discovery violation?




The District Court’s Instruction Informing The Jury Pool That A Prior Trial Had Occurred,
That Mr. Johnson’s Prior Convictions Were Overturned, And That The Idaho Supreme
Court Had Remanded His Case For A New Trial Violated Mr. Johnson’s Constitutional
Right To A Fair Trial Before An Impartial Jury
A. Introduction
When the district court called in the jury pool to complete juror questionnaires,
the court provided introductory instructions.  These instructions included a statement
that a prior trial had occurred in 2006 and that following an appeal, the Idaho Supreme
Court had reversed and remanded the case for a new trial.  This instruction included no
direction to the jury that the prior trial should not be considered and effectively
prejudiced the entire jury panel.  Later, defense counsel requested that the district court
draw a new jury panel.  The district court denied the motion and proceeded with the
panel.  Mr. Johnson’s constitutional right to a fair trial before an impartial jury was
violated when the jury, which had been prejudicially informed of Mr. Johnson’s previous
conviction for the same charges, was allowed to hear his case.
B. Standard Of Review
Constitutional claims are reviewed de novo. State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214, 218
(2014).  Trial errors ordinarily will not be addressed on appeal unless a timely objection
was made in the trial court. State v. Adams, 147 Idaho 857, 861 (Ct. App. 2009).
Because Mr. Johnson made a timely objection, he only has the duty to prove that an
error occurred, “at which point the State has the burden of demonstrating that the error
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010).
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C. The District Court’s Instruction Informing The Jury Pool That A Prior Trial Had
Occurred,  That Mr. Johnson’s Prior Convictions Were Overturned, And That The
Idaho Supreme Court Had Remanded His Case For A New Trial Violated
Mr. Johnson’s Constitutional Right To A Fair Trial Before An Impartial Jury
Prior to the start of trial, potential jurors were called in, sworn, given preliminary
jury instructions, and asked to fill out a supplemental juror questionnaire.  (R., pp.555-
558; Tr. 6/22/11, p.4, L.4 – p.18, L.12; Tr. 6/23/11, p.18, L.4 – p.29, L.8.)3 During these
hearings, the district court read the following to the jury, “. . . There was a prior trial in
this case in 2006.  Following an appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the case to this court for a new trial. . . .”  (R., p.550; Tr. 6/22/11, p.5, Ls.12-
15, p.11, Ls.20-23; Tr. 6/23/11, p.19, Ls.14-17, p.25, Ls.14-16.)  The statement did not
contain any limiting or curative language informing the jury that they were not to
consider the prior trial, conviction, or appeal.  (R., p.550-551; Tr. 6/22/11, p.4, L.19 –
p.27, L.24, p.11, L.5 – p.14, L.4; Tr. 6/23/11, p.18, L.21 – p.21, L.20, p.24, L.24 – p.27,
L.20.)  Defense counsel was not present during the hearings where the preliminary
instructions were read.  (R., pp.555-558.)
At the start of trial, Mr. Johnson filed a Defendant’s Motion in Limine requesting
an order from the district court prohibiting the State from “[m]aking any reference to a
prior trial in this case” and requesting, that to the extent that witnesses need to refer to
the prior trial, that it be referred to as “a previous hearing in this case.”  (R., p.565.)  The
district court immediately informed defense counsel that the jury panel had already been
told that there was a prior trial and appeal during the hearings where the potential jurors
completed the supplemental questionnaires.  (Tr., p.74. Ls.8-14.)  Defense counsel
3 The transcript of the jury trial and sentencing hearing will be cited as “Tr.”
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expressed concern that the jurors had been informed that Mr. Johnson had been
previously convicted, although that word was not specifically used, stating, “I think the
only reasonable inference that any but brain-dead jurors could take from that would be
that he’s been convicted, and then that conjures up these paradigms of technicalities
and so forth. . . . I don’t see how we unring that bell.”  (Tr., p.75, Ls.13-21, p.76, Ls.18-
24, p.77, L.9.)
The district court noted that it had sent the script out to counsel, asked for
objections, and received none. (Tr., p.77, Ls.10-14.)  Defense counsel stated that he
had not seen the script, that he could not say it had not been sent, but that had he seen
it or been present when it was read, he would have objected.  (Tr., p.77, Ls.15-22.)
Following a discussion of options that the parties had, defense counsel again objected
stating:
I think it is objectionable.  I think it has now tainted the jury to the extent
that they have to understand that the case went up and, as the language
says, it was reversed.  There’s also already been a conviction.
Consequently, this is not like – I’ve had a lot of experience with
hung juries where you’re trying a case for a second time.  More than once,
I’ve tried cases for a third time.  That’s much easier for both counsel to
work with because 12 people were not convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt, but they were also not unanimous in finding the defendant not
guilty.
Here, the inference is that there was a jury of 12 who were
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty.  And another
vexing part of that, of course, is that there’s already enough notoriety
surrounding this case, as I think the questionnaires disclose, so – although
I know the Court is going to deny my motion, given all the time and effort
that has gone into this, I would move that this matter be vacated, that we
select a new panel, and that they not be informed of the reversal and
remand.
(Tr., p.80, L.18 – p.81, L.16.)
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After taking a short recess, the district court denied the motion to vacate and
noted that should either party need to refer to the prior trial that they should
“appropriately refer to it as a prior proceeding or a prior hearing.”  (Tr., p.82, L.20 – p.83,
L.5.)  The issue of referring to the prior trial was brought up again prior to the
presentation of evidence and the district court reaffirmed its ruling that the parties would
not use the word trial, but would refer to the prior trial as a prior hearing or proceeding.4
(Tr., p.460, L.7 – p.463, L.4.)
The district court’s instruction informing jurors that Mr. Johnson had already been
convicted of the precise charges before them and had been awarded a new trial when
the Idaho Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case violated his constitutional
right to a fair trial before an impartial jury.  The erroneous instruction set a tone of
prejudice for the jury’s first impression of the case.  The Sixth Amendment guarantees
that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  Further, the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees that no one may be deprived “of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of the law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  Taken together, these provisions
guarantee every criminal defendant a fair trial before an impartial jury. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-686 (1984); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148
(1968); State v. Nadlman, 63 Idaho 153, 118 P.2d 58, 61-62 (1941).
4 Despite of the district court’s ruling, twice during the trial Michelle Johnson, the alleged
victim’s mother, mentioned the prior trial in answering questions.  (Tr., p.946, Ls.2-5;
p.950, Ls.13-23.)  No contemporaneous objection was made when Ms. Johnson
mentioned the prior trial, presumably to avoid drawing further attention to the improper
information already before the jury.  However, defense counsel did mention it to the
court and the State agreed to discuss the issue with her again.  (Tr., p.990, L.22 –
p.991, L.25.)
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This Court has long recognized that an accused’s right to a fair trial before an
impartial jury can be compromised when a jury is made aware of an accused’s prior
convictions.  For example, in cases where the State alleges the defendant is subject to
punishment as a persistent violator due to prior convictions, or is subject to substantially
greater punishment due to prior convictions for similar conduct, this Court has held
jurors cannot be told of or presented with evidence of the prior convictions unless the
defendant is first found guilty of the substantive offense. State v. Wiggins, 96 Idaho
766, 768 (1975) (felony DUI based on defendant’s prior DUIs); State v. Johnson, 86
Idaho 51, 61 (1963) (persistent violator based on prior convictions).  In such cases, the
trial is bifurcated with the substantive offense tried first, and then if a defendant is found
guilty, the State can then present evidence of the prior convictions. Wiggins, 96 Idaho
at 768; Johnson, 86 Idaho at 61.  This bifurcated procedure recognizes a defendant’s
right to a fair and impartial trial may be compromised if evidence of a defendant’s prior
convictions is allowed during the trial of the substantive offense. Id.  This procedure
also recognizes jurors’ exposure to evidence of a defendant’s prior convictions is so
prejudicial and damning, that it cannot be erased or cured by a limiting instruction.
Wiggins, 96 Idaho at 768; Johnson, 86 Idaho at 61-62.
Even more prejudicial than jurors’ knowledge of a defendant’s prior convictions
for unrelated crimes is jurors’ knowledge that a defendant has previously been found
guilty of the same crime which  is  the  subject  of  the  trial.   The  Fifth  Circuit  Court  of
Appeals concluded “we are hard pressed to think of anything more damning to an
accused than information a jury had previously convicted him for the crime charged.”
United States v. Williams, 568 F.2d 464, 470-71 (5th Cir. 1978) (two jurors’ exposure to
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information about defendants’ convictions at first trial resulted in an unfair second trial,
even though the two jurors said they could disregard the information and decide the
case solely on evidence adduced in court).
In fact, a number of courts have recognized that jurors’ knowledge that the
defendant was previously found guilty of the same offense for which he is now on trial is
so prejudicial that it constitutes a denial of the Constitutional right to a fair trial. See,
e.g., Hughes v. State, 490 A.2d 1034, 1044-46 (Del. 1985) (holding jurors’ knowledge of
defendant’s prior trial and conviction for same offense, which was discussed among
jurors prior to deliberations, raised a presumption of jury bias that violated the
defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury); State v. Lee, 346 So. 2d 682, 683-85 (La.
1977) (finding a violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial where the
prosecutor, during closing arguments, highlighted the fact that the defendant had
previously been found guilty).5 See also, e.g., Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F3d 663, 682-83
(4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing, in dicta, that a violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to an impartial jury trial may occur if the jury learned the defendant had previously
been found guilty of murder and sentenced to death).
Other courts that have dealt with this issue, although not necessarily asked to
rule on Constitutional grounds, have nearly universally found that, although a reference
to a prior trial is a relatively minor error that can be corrected with a curative instruction,
a reference to the outcome of a previous trial is so extraordinarily prejudicial that it will
5 Compare State v. Williams, 445 So.2d 1171, 1177 (La. 1984) (finding no error in the
trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for a mistrial when a witness referenced the
defendant’s prior trial, in part, because the witness did not reveal the outcome of that
trial).
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typically require a new trial. United States v. Attell, 655 F.2d 703, 704-05 (5th Cir. 1981)
(reversing the defendant’s conviction where mid-trial publicity revealed that the
defendant had previously been convicted, but had won a new trial on appeal, and where
the trial judge had refused to poll the jurors to determine if any had been witness to the
publicity in question); Frazier v. State, 632 So.2d 1002, 1007 (Ala. Ct. App. 1993) (“The
appellant asserts that the prosecutor committed reversible error when he referred to the
appellant’s previous conviction for the offense for which he was being tried.  We must
agree.”)6, Williams v. State, 629 P.2d 54, 58-60 (Alaska 1981) (holding trial court erred
in denying the defense’s motion for a mistrial following prosecutor’s statement that
defendant’s prior jury trial for the same offense was hung 11 to 1); State v. Lawrence,
599 P.2d 754, 758 (Ariz. 1979) (finding no error in a witness’s reference to an earlier
trial because that reference did not reveal the outcome of that trial); Bailey v. State, 521
A.2d 1069, 1076-77 (Del. 1987) (“The jury not only learned that the defendant had been
previously tried for the same charge, but that the 1980 trial had ended in a conviction.
That information, regardless of how it is received, is inherently prejudicial and even
more so when a jury is exposed to those facts during trial.”); Duque v. State, 498 So.2d
1334, 1337 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding where newspaper article published during
the defendant’s trial reported the defendant had been convicted at her first trial, the trial
court’s refusal to grant defense counsel’s motion to question jurors about the article was
reversible error and finding error in the prosecutor’s comment on a witness’s testimony
6 Compare Sneed v. State, 1 So.3d 104, 114-15 (Ala. Ct. App. 2007) (“In this case,
none of the references to a first trial or to prior proceedings specifically informed the jury
that the appellant had previously been convicted of capital murder and sentenced to
death. Accordingly, we do not find that there was any plain error in this regard.”).
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that defendant was sentenced to jail following first trial)7; Hood v. State, 537 S.E.2d 788,
790 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (“Where there is no mention of the result of a prior judicial
proceeding, the bare reference to an earlier trial does not necessarily imply a conviction
and reversal on appeal. . . .  Since the record contains no reference to the earlier verdict
of guilt, the trial court's curative instructions were adequate to remove the subject from
the jury's consideration.”); People v. Jones, 528 N.E.2d 648, 658 (Ill. 1988) (finding no
error in the decision to deny the defendant’s motion for a mistrial where a prosecution
witness alluded to the defendant’s first trial but did not reveal the outcome of that trial)8;
Major v. Commonwealth, 275 S.W.3d 706, 716-17 (Ky. 2009) (finding no error in the
decision to deny the defendant’s motion for a mistrial where a witness mentioned the
defendant’s first trial but “did not indicate any favorable or unfavorable outcome”);
Coffey v. State, 642 A.2d 276, 281-85 (Md. Ct. App. 1994) (holding experienced police
officers’ repeated testimony that the defendant had previously been tried and convicted
of the same charges, where curative instruction served to emphasize the inadmissible
testimony, required mistrial because it deprived the defendant of a fair trial).  The
rationale for this standard was well-put by the Delaware Supreme Court:
“[W]e are hard-pressed to think of anything more damning to an accused
than information that a jury had previously convicted him for the crime
7 See also Weber v. State, 501 So.2d 1379, 1381-85 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (finding
error in the trial court’s failure to declare a mistrial where the jury learned (from outside
information) that the defendant had previously been found guilty and had received a 99-
year sentence, and that the defendant had won a new trial based on a “technicality”).
Compare Brooks v. State, 918 So.2d 181, 208 (Fla. 2005) (affirming the trial court’s
denial of the defendant’s motion for a mistrial where the government repeatedly
referenced the defendant’s previous trial but did not reveal that the defendant had been
convicted at that trial).
8 Cf. McDonnell v. McPartlin, 736 N.E.2d 1074, 1091 (Ill. 2000) (holding, in the civil
context, that the trial court did not err in denying a motion for a mistrial where a witness
referenced the first trial of the matter, but did not disclose the result of that trial).
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charged.” United States v. Williams, 568 F.2d 464, 471 (5th Cir. 1978). It
seems unreasonable to expect a juror to divorce from his deliberative
process, knowledge that a defendant has been previously tried and
convicted, and following a reversal has been once again subjected to
prosecution. The mere expenditure of so much time and expense on the
part of the State might lead the average lay person to assume that such a
defendant must, in fact, be guilty.
Hughes, 490 A.2d at 1044 (quoted with approval in Bailey, 521 A.2d at 1076, and
Coffey, 642 A.2d at 282). See also Bordenkircher, 715 F.2d at 119 (quoting, with
approval, the quoted language from Williams); Attell, 655 F.2d at 705 (same).
In recent years, Idaho appellate courts have addressed similar issues in State v.
Watkins, 152 Idaho 764 (Ct. App. 2012) and State v. Lankford, Docket No. 35617
(July 25, 2016) (2016 Opinion No. 82) (petition for rehearing granted).9 Both cases are
easily distinguishable from the facts of Mr. Johnson’s case.
In Watkins, the jury was informed that a prior trial and appeal had occurred
through answers provided by a police officer on cross-examination:  “In my transcript
from the – well, can I say that because I was told I can’t talk about the prior trial. . . . I
read the transcript of the prior trial after the appeals court-so it that’s what you’re
asking.” Watkins, 152 Idaho at 765.  After defense counsel’s motion for a mistrial, the
district court determined that a mistrial would not be granted and provided a curative
instruction.  The district court instructed the jury:  “You have heard testimony that there
was a previous trial in this matter.  You are not to speculate as to the result of that
previous trial.” Id. The Court of Appeals noted that it did not need to “decide whether
the disclosure of a prior conviction for the same offense would be cause for an
9 For ease of reference State v. Lankford will  be  cited  as  “Lankford” and the page
numbers from the Idaho Supreme Court opinion, as found on the Idaho Supreme Court
website, will be used.
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automatic declaration of a mistrial because the police officer mentioned only a ‘prior
trial’ and ‘the appeals court,’ without revealing the result of Watkins’ first trial or saying
which party appealed.” Id. at 766.  The Court found that these statements were not
“equivalent to the disclosure that a previous jury had found him guilty.” Id.  While noting
that the disclosure “was a serious error,” the Court held that it did not warrant a mistrial
ipso facto. Id. at 767.  The Court of Appeals concluded that, due to the overwhelming
evidence of guilt and the curative instruction, the police officer’s “improper disclosures”
were harmless. Id. at 769.
Unlike Watkins, the jury in Mr. Johnson’s case was essentially informed that
Mr. Johnson had been previously convicted:  “. . . There was a prior trial in this case in
2006.  Following an appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case
to this court for a new trial. . . .”  (R., p.550; Tr. 6/22/11, p.5, Ls.12-15, p.11, Ls.20-23;
Tr. 6/23/11, p.19, Ls.14-17, p.25, Ls.14-16.)  No viable inference, other than that
Mr. Johnson had been previously convicted, can be drawn from the terms used by the
district court - prior trial and reversed.  Additionally, in Mr. Johnson’s case, the jury was
not provided with a curative or limiting instruction. See generally Tr.  As such, the jury
was not immediately, or ever, told that the erroneous information regarding a prior trial,
conviction, and reversal by the appellate court could not be considered as evidence of
guilt or be allowed to influence the jurors, thereby increasing the harm of the erroneous
instruction.  (R., p.550-551; Tr. 6/22/11, p.4, L.19 – p.27, L.24, p.11, L.5 – p.14, L.4;
Tr. 6/23/11, p.18, L.21 – p.21, L.20, p.24, L.24 – p.27, L.20; See generally Tr.)
In a scenario closer to Mr. Johnson’s, during voir dire the district court in
Lankford instructed the jury:  “There was a prior trial in Idaho County in 1984 for the
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offenses for which he is now charged.  And an Appeals Court held that Mr. Lankford
was not effectively represented and that his trial was therefore unfair.” Lankford, pp.2,
5.  The Idaho Supreme Court held that it would not address the question of whether the
disclosure of a prior conviction for the same offense would result in implied basis, as the
instruction did not mention that Lankford had been previously convicted or found guilty.
Lankford, p.5.  It determined that the actual issue was whether the district court’s
mentioning a prior trial and appeal was so extremely and inherently prejudicial that the
jury could not be rehabilitated though further questioning and then held that it was not.
Lankford, p.5.
The Idaho Supreme Court noted three specific reasons that relief was not
justified.  First, the district court had not revealed the outcome of the prior trial and that
this information “simply does not carry the same weight” as information that a defendant
had been previously convicted. Lankford, pp.6-7.  Second, defense counsel did not
object to the district court’s statement, nor request that the prior trial not be mentioned,
and expressly questioned the jurors “about the fact that they’ll be referring at times to
the prior hearings and prior trial.” Lankford, p.5.  Third, following the instruction, the
district court “properly questioned the jurors whether their knowledge of the previous
trial would cause them to have actual bias against Lankford and properly instructed the
jurors that the must presume Lankford innocent regardless of his prior trial.” Lankford,
p.8.  The district court specifically instructed the jury that: “As jurors you are not to
consider the earlier trial and deliberate on whether or not Mr. Lankford is guilty.  In other
words, you must presume him to be innocent and judge the charges against him solely
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on the evidence that is presented during this trial without considering in any manner his
earlier trial.” Lankford, p.8.
As noted above, the district court’s erroneous preliminary instruction in
Mr. Johnson’s case is more egregious than the one given in Lankford because it uses
the word “reversed,” clearly indicating that it was Mr. Johnson’s prior conviction that had
been reversed.  As defense counsel noted when objecting, although the word conviction
was not specifically used, “the only reasonable inference that any but brain-dead jurors
could take from that would be that he’s been convicted . . .”  (Tr., p.76, Ls.20-23.)  To
find that reversal, as used in this context, meant anything other than the reversal of a
conviction, would be an endorsement of informing a jury about a prior trial and
conviction in any way possible, as long as the exact word “conviction” was not used.
Simply, the plain language of reversed and remanded means only one thing –
Mr. Johnson’s convictions were reversed and the case remanded.
Further, unlike counsel in Lankford, counsel for Mr. Johnson did object to the
mentioning of the prior trial, conviction, and appeal at the earliest opportunity.  Defense
counsel was not at any of the hearings when the preliminary instructions were read so
he did not have an opportunity to object at that time.  (R., pp.555-558.)  When the
district court noted that it had sent the script out to counsel, asked for objections, and
received none, defense counsel noted that he had not seen the script, that he could not
say it had not been sent, but that had he seen it or been present when it was read, he
would have objected.  (Tr., p.77, Ls.10-22.)  Furthermore, prior to the start of trial,
counsel filed a filed a motion in limine attempting to prevent any such prejudicial error
from occurring.  The motion requested an order from the district court prohibiting the
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State from “[m]aking any reference to a prior trial in this case” and requesting, that to
the extent that witnesses need to referred to the prior trial, that it be referred to as “a
previous hearing in this case.”   (R., p.565.)
Additionally, unlike the jury in Lankford, Mr. Johnson’s jury was not provided any
potential rehabilitation through additional questioning related to the inappropriate
information presented by the district court or in the form of a limiting instruction.
Defense counsel’s position was that the only appropriate remedy was to select a new
jury panel.  (Tr., p.81, Ls.13-16.)  However, the State suggested that the jury not be
subject to questioning about the prior trial or appeal:  “You Honor, I think that jury – and
I don’t know how you question them from this point on.  I think the best thing to do is to
stay away from it, because if you do question them, it could taint them further.  If there is
any tainting. . . “  (Tr., p.77, L.25 – p.78, L.5.)  As a result, no follow-up questions were
presented to the jury.
Moreover, as was also noted above, the jury was not provided with a curative or
limiting instruction informing the jury that the prior trial, conviction, and reversal by the
appellate court could not be considered as evidence of guilt.  (See generally Tr.)  This
was in stark contrast to other portions of the instructions.  For example, after the district
court summarized the charges contained in the information, the district court noted that
the jurors “must not consider [the information] as evidence of guilt and you must not be
influenced by the fact that charges have been filed.”  (R, p.550; Tr. 6/22/11, p.5, Ls.19-
21, p.12, Ls.2-4; Tr. 6/23/11, p.19, Ls.21-23, p.25, Ls.20-22.)
Because the district court’s erroneous instruction implied that Mr. Johnson had
been previously convicted of the same crimes, defense counsel objected to the jury
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receiving the improper information, there was no follow-up questioning of jurors to see if
the information created an actual bias, and there was no limiting instruction provided,
Mr. Johnson’s case is clearly distinguishable from both Watkins and Lankford.  Based
on the distinctive factual scenario presented in his case, Mr. Johnson asserts that his
case requires a different result.
The jurors’ knowledge of Mr. Johnson’s prior trial and conviction for the same
offenses was inherently prejudicial, depriving him of his presumption of innocence and
his constitutional right to fair trial before an impartial jury.  The error in advising jurors of
Mr. Johnson’s prior trial, conviction, and appeal for the same offenses affected his
substantial rights and likely affected the outcome of his trial.  As such, Mr. Johnson’s
convictions must be vacated and his case remanded for a new trial before a fair and
impartial jury.
D. The State Will Be Unable To Prove That The District Court’s Erroneous
Instruction Is Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
The harmless error doctrine has been defined by this Court:  “To hold an error as
harmless, an appellate court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
there was no reasonable possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the
conviction.” State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).  Where alleged error is followed by a contemporaneous
objection and the appellant shows that a violation occurred, the State bears the burden
of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon the test
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman. See State v. Perry, 150
Idaho 209, 227 (2010). The State will simply be unable to prove that the district court’s
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instruction error depriving Mr. Johnson of his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury was
harmless.
As discussed above, this issue has been addressed by numerous other courts
which have nearly universally held that jurors’ knowledge that another jury has found
the defendant guilty of the precise offense at issue is uniquely prejudicial, such that it
requires that the defendant be granted a new trial. See, e.g., Bordenkircher, 715 F.2d
at 118-20; Fullwood, 290 F3d at 682-83; Attell, 655 F.2d at 704-05; Frazier, 632 So.2d
at 1007; Williams, 629 P.2d at 58-60; Bailey, 521 A.2d at 1076-77; Hughes, 490 A.2d at
1044-46; Duque, 498 So.2d at 1337; Lee, 346 So. 2d at 683-85; Coffey, 642 A.2d at
281-85.  As noted, a number of these courts have concluded that there is nothing “more
damning to an accused than information that a jury had previously convicted him for the
crime charged.” Williams, 568 F.2d at 471. Accord Bordenkircher, 715 F.2d at 119
(quoting Williams); Attell, 655 F.2d at 705 (same); Hughes, 490 A.2d at 1044 (same);
Bailey, 521 A.2d at 1076 (quoting Hughes quoting Williams); Coffey, 642 A.2d at 282
(same).  In addition, knowledge that a different group of twelve disinterested jurors
found Mr. Johnson guilty would likely have a subconscious effect on the jurors, making
it easier for them to convict Mr. Johnson.  Jurors would not only feel a certain amount of
subtle pressure to conform by voting for guilt as others had, but they would also feel a
diminished sense of responsibility for the ultimate verdict.
Given the tremendously prejudicial effect of informing the jury that Mr. Johnson
was previously found guilty by a different jury, it simply cannot be said that “there was
no reasonable possibility” that the district court’s instruction regarding the prior trial did
not contribute to the jury’s verdicts.  The Fourth Circuit explicitly noted that such an error
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could not be harmless when it deemed a court’s instruction advising jurors of the
defendant’s prior conviction in the same case to be prejudicial error requiring a new trial:
            We find the error in this case of allowing the jury to receive as its
first impression in the case the admitted fact that the defendant had
already been convicted of the same crime and that the present jury was to
retry the defendant only because the prior conviction was reversed on
procedural grounds cannot be considered harmless error beyond a
reasonable doubt as required by Chapman [v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-
24 (1967)], even though the evidence of guilt was great and the defense of
insanity tenuous. When the jury heard the judge’s instruction, approved by
defense counsel, [the defendant’s] chances for a fair trial by an impartial
jury were seriously and irreparably prejudiced.
Arthur v. Bordenkircher, 715 F.2d 118, 120 (4th Cir. 1983).
II.
The District Court Erred In Denying The Motion For A Mistrial Made After The State
Improperly Commented On Mr. Johnson’s Invocation Of His Right To Silence
A. Introduction
The State presented the testimony of Detective Snarr.  In response to a question
from the State, Detective Snarr testified that he had attempted to interview Mr. Johnson.
The detective’s response to the State’s question prejudicially persuaded the jury to infer
guilt from Mr. Johnson’s previous assertions of his rights.  Defense counsel immediately
objected and made a motion for a mistrial.  The district court found that the testimony
was prejudicial, but denied the motion for a mistrial.  The district court then provided a
curative instruction that increased the prejudicial nature of the testimony and further
highlighted the prejudicial information. The instruction provided by the district court was
insufficient to cure the prejudice.  As such, Mr. Johnson asserts that the motion for a
mistrial was erroneously denied.
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B. Standard Of Review
Idaho’s appellate courts effectively review denials of motions for mistrial de novo.
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007).
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge
reasonably exercised his discretion in light of circumstances
existing when the mistrial motion was made. Rather, the
question must be whether the event which precipitated the
motion for mistrial represented reversible error when viewed
in the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion for
mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the “abuse of
discretion” standard is a misnomer. The standard, more
accurately stated, is one of reversible error. Our focus is
upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that
triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to
declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident,
viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error.
Id. (quoting State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 912 (2003) (quoting
State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho 54, 57 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting State v. Urquhart, 105
Idaho 92, 95 (Ct. App. 1983))). Error is harmless and not reversible if the reviewing
court is convinced “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010).
C. The District Court Erred In Denying The Motion For A Mistrial Made After The
State Improperly Commented On Mr. Johnson’s Invocation Of His Right To
Silence
A motion for a mistrial is controlled by I.C.R. 29.1, which provides that “[a] mistrial
may be declared upon motion of the defendant, when there occurs during the trial an
error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or outside the courtroom,
which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial.”  I.C.R.
29.1(a); State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 389 (Ct. App. 1996).  Mr. Johnson asserts that
the district court erred in failing to grant a mistrial.
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Detective Snarr was asked if he had interviewed anyone else after sitting through
the CARES interview, talking to Michelle Johnson, and Joann Johnson.  (Tr., p.726,
Ls.17-24.)  He responded that he “[t]ried to interview Mr. Johnson.”  (Tr., p.726, L.25.)
Defense counsel immediately objected, asked that the jury be excused, and then moved
for a mistrial, stating, “Detective Snarr has just said that he tried to interview
Mr. Johnson.  He has deliberately implied to this jury that he was unable to do so.
Mr. Johnson stood on his constitutional rights to have an attorney present, to not make
a statement.”  (Tr., p.727, Ls.13-21.)
After a break to review case law, the district court asked the State if it had “any
purpose for this answer in terms of developing additional testimony or any other
direction that the State was going to go with this information.”  (Tr., p.729, Ls.1-5.)  The
State responded that it did not, that it was merely collecting a list of the individuals that
Detective Snarr had interviewed.  (Tr., p.729, Ls.6-7.)  The Court noted that “the clear
upshot and import of this testimony is an inference of evasiveness or perhaps even of
guilt at least as the answer now stands as it pertains to the defendant and that’s an
impermissible inference or implication . . .”  (Tr., p.729, Ls.16-21.)  After further follow-
up questions, the State then noted that it was not planning on using Mr. Johnson’s pre-
arrest silence for impeachment purposes if he later testified.  (Tr., p.731, Ls.7-8.)  The
court then noted that “as it stands at this point I’m satisfied and convinced that just the
way the answer’s phased and the words used creates an impermissible inference of
guilt.”  (Tr., p.731, Ls.20-23.)  However, the court again provided the State an
opportunity to point out any legitimate probative value of the statement.  (Tr., p.734,
Ls.15-19.)  The prosecution stated, “I’m struggling to come up with what’s there, but
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[sic] other than providing you with what the alternative inferences could be other than to
explain with Detective Snarr was doing in his investigation . . .”  (Tr., p.734, Ls.21-25.)
The district court rejected the other possible inferences and again noted, “[w]ell, the only
way to read this statement then in conjunction with the additional information that you
presented is a direct comment on the defendant’s position that he wasn’t going to
interview with the detective, that he was going to have to talk to his attorney.”
(Tr., p.735, Ls.6-11.)
In discussing a possible remedy to the violation of Mr. Johnson’s constitutional
rights, defense counsel argued for the declaration of a mistrial and against a limiting
instruction:
This is the functional equivalent of a prosecutor’s comment on the
defendant’s exercise of his Fifth Amendment right not to testify, and if that
happened during closing argument, this Court would not entertain any
argument that it could be cured with a curative instruction.  That’s the
problem.  I don’t think that the genie can’t be put back in the bottle.  That
was a violation of a constitutional right, not a procedural right.  It’s not an
evidentiary issue.  It is a constitutional issue.
. . .
[And], I’m not going to a [sic] join the Court in that instruction. . . .
It’s certainly not the instruction that I would request.  The problem in these
situations, as I think the Court has well anticipated, is that one never
knows whether the wound is being treated or the wound is simply being
made more severe.
(Tr., p.736, Ls.15-25, p.738, L.20 – p.739, L.3.)  Defense counsel then requested that
the jury be informed that the significant delay in the case was not attributed to the
objection because “[w]e’ve been in trial since 9:00 this morning, and the jury has not yet
heard an hour of testimony and I’ve been forced twice, under circumstances I have no
control over, to make objections and ask for these proceedings out of the presence of
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the jury in a way that can easily be interpreted by the jury as being my efforts to try to
obscure the case . . .”  (Tr., p.739, Ls.5-15.)  The district court determined that it would
provide a limiting instruction and deferred ruling on the motion for mistrial so that it could
later assess whether or not Mr. Johnson had been afforded a fair trial.  (Tr., p.737,
Ls.16-25.)
Despite the defense’s objection to the limiting instruction and other requests, the
district court told the jury:
Now, we’re at the situation where just before we recessed there was [an]
objection to an answer given by Detective Snarr, and do I will now make a
formal ruling on that objection and that ruling is this:  The objection is
sustained.  The last answer given by Detective Snarr is stricken.  A
defendant has a constitutional right to remain silent.  The decision whether
to exercise this right is left to the defendant.  You, the members of the jury,
are instructed to disregard the last answer given and to not consider that
answer during your deliberations.  You are further instructed that you are
not to draw any inferences at all from the testimony that has been stricken.
(Tr., p.745, L.24 – p.746, L.12.)
After the State rested, defense counsel requested that the district court rule on
the motions for mistrial.  (Tr., p.1070, Ls.25-25, p.1084, Ls.12-13.)  The district court
denied the motion for mistrial.  (Tr., p.1084, L.14 – p.1085, L.6.)
The Fifth Amendment guarantees “[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself....”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  A defendant
who testifies in his own behalf waives his privilege against self-incrimination with
respect to the relevant matters covered by his direct testimony and subjects himself to
cross-examination by the government. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154-55,
78 S.Ct. 622, 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958); Whiteley v. State, 131 Idaho 323, 328, 955 P.2d
1102, 1107 (1998).   However, parties are not entitled to draw any inference from a
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witness’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment.  KENNETH S. BROUN, ET AL.,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 137 at 512 (John William Strong, ed., 4th ed.1992).
Further, in a criminal case, a prosecutor may not directly or indirectly comment on a
defendant’s invocation of his constitutional right to remain silent, either at trial or before
trial, for the purposes of inferring guilt. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); see
also State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698, 701 (Ct. App. 2005) (“A defendant's decision to
exercise his or her right to remain silent, whether before or after arrest and Miranda
warnings, cannot be used for the purpose of inferring guilt.”); State v. Molen, 148 Idaho
950, 959 (Ct. App. 2010) (“A defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent
concerning an alleged offense may not be used by the State at trial in order to raise an
inference of guilt.”)  In cases of pre-Miranda,10 pre-arrest silence, the prosecutor may
not use that evidence “solely for the purpose of implying guilt;” however, the prosecutor
may use pre-Miranda silence, either pre- or post-arrest, for impeachment of the
defendant. State v. Parton, 154 Idaho 558, 566 (2013) (quoting State v. Moore, 131
Idaho 814, 821 (1998)); State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 60 (2011).
It is clear that the State presented testimony, whether elicited or not, that
implicated an inference of guilt from Mr. Johnson’s silence.  Mr. Johnson asserts, in
accordance with the district court’s findings, that the testimony of Detective Snarr
created an inference of guilt and that the State had failed to assert any legitimate
reasons for presenting the testimony.   (Tr., p.731, Ls.20-23, p.734, Ls.21-25, p.735,
Ls.6-11.)  As such, the presentation of the testimony was clear error and a violation of
Mr. Johnson’s Fifth Amendment rights.
10 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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In addition, Mr. Johnson asserts that the error amounts to reversible error.  This
is due, in part, to the district court’s limiting instruction, to which defense counsel
objected.  (Tr., p.738, L.20 – p.739, L.3.)  If there was any chance that the jury would
not have recognized the inference of guilt, that chance was destroyed by the district
court’s instruction, which compounded the error.  The district court did not merely
instruct the jury to disregard the testimony, but highlighted the inference of guilt, making
sure it was in the forefront of the juror’s minds before then telling them to “not draw any
inferences.”  (Tr., p.746, Ls.10-12.)  Unfortunately, the district court’s instruction created
a how-to guide for drawing an impermissible inference and heightened the prejudicial
impact of the already prejudicial information.
While a curative instruction can be an effective remedy, an instruction can also
be an insufficient remedy. State v. Watkins, 152 Idaho 764, 767–68 (Ct. App. 2012).
“[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow
instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that
the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.” Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968).  Mr. Johnson asserts that his case is a case
where the jury instruction presented an insufficient remedy.  This is especially true
because the instruction precipitated the jury’s inability to put aside the negative
inference of guilt.
Not only is the inference of guilt particularly damming and prejudicial, but in this
case it deprived Mr. Johnson of a fair trial.  When viewed in the context of the full
record, the improper inference of guilt likely had a continuing impact on the trial.  In this
case, the jury was told that Mr. Johnson had been previously convicted of the charges.
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(R., p.550; Tr. 6/22/11, p.5, Ls.12-15, p.11, Ls.20-23; Tr. 6/23/11, p.19, Ls.14-17, p.25,
Ls.14-16.)  This improper information was inherently prejudicial and the trial started with
an atmosphere in which Mr. Johnson was not presumed innocent, but essentially
presumed guilty.   The jury later learning that Mr. Johnson had invoked his constitutional
right to remain silent likely had a stronger effect on the jury than it would have in a case
where the jurors had not already learned that the defendant had been previously found
guilty.  Even with the instruction to ignore the evidence, the jury was likely unable to put
the prejudicial thought – only a guilty person would not talk to the police – out of their
mind.  In effect, the limiting instruction, as given, did not cure the prejudicial inference of
guilt.  The jury had to weigh the credibility of Mr. Johnson, who asserted his innocence,
against other witnesses in his case.  It is probable that a jury hearing that Mr. Johnson
had been previously convicted and had invoked his right to remain silent would not
evaluate his testimony in same way as a jury that had not been exposed to the
prejudicial information.
As such, there is a great danger that the jury did not disregard the stricken
testimony, but that it considered it to Mr. Johnson’s detriment, that it had a continuing
impact on the trial, may have contributed to the verdict, and, ultimately, deprived
Mr. Johnson of his right to a fair trial.  As such, it was error for the district court to not
declare a mistrial.
D. Additionally, The State Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct When It Improperly
Commented On Mr. Johnson’s Invocation Of His Right To Silence
Prosecutorial misconduct claims that are grounded in constitutional principles
involve questions of law over which this Court exercises free review. City of Boise v.
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Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 2 (2006).  Trial error ordinarily will not be addressed on appeal
unless a timely objection was made in the trial court. State v. Adams, 147 Idaho 857,
861 (Ct. App. 2009).  For alleged errors for which there was a timely objection,
Mr. Johnson only has the duty to prove that an error occurred, “at which point the State
has the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010).
“[I]t [is] the duty of the Government to establish . . . guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.  This notion-basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society-is a
requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of
‘due process.’” Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-803 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).  The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that, “[n]o
person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”
U.S. CONST. amend. V.  Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment states, “[n]o state
shall…deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  Additionally, the Idaho Constitution also guarantees that,
“[n]o person shall be…deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.”
ID. CONST. art. I, §13.  Due process requires criminal trials to be fundamentally fair.
Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978). Prosecutorial misconduct may so
unfairly contaminate the trial as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process. State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318 (Ct. App. 2005); Greer v. Miller, 483
U.S. 756, 765 (1987).  In order to constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial
misconduct must be of sufficient consequence to result in the denial of the defendant’s
right to a fair trial. Id.  The hallmark of due process analysis in cases of alleged
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prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982).  The aim of due process is not the
punishment of society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial
to the accused. Id.
In the case at hand, as in State v Parker and State v. Ellington, the prosecution
committed misconduct when it elicited the response from Detective Snarr that he had
“[t]ried to interview Mr. Johnson.”  (Tr., p.726, L.25.)  In Parker, the Idaho Supreme
Court noted that it was an improper line of questioning when the prosecutor elicited
information about Mr. Parker ending his interview with police. State v. Parker, 157
Idaho 132, 147 (2014).  The Court noted that the testimony was used for the sole
purpose of informing the jury that Mr. Parker had invoked his right to silence, the State
was unable to provide a reason why the testimony was necessary or relevant, and
“even if Detective Smith offered an unsolicited comment on Parker's invocation of his
rights, Detective Smith's actions are imputed to the State.” Id.  The Court concluded
that the line of questioning caused an improper comment on Parker’s silence for the
purpose of implying guilt and amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. Id.  Ultimately, the
Court found the error was not fundamental because although the jury may have inferred
guilt from Parker's silence, the jury was also “introduced to ample evidence of guilt with
Parker's own incriminating statements made during that same interview. This is not a
case where the defendant did not answer any questions posited by law enforcement
and the prosecutor sought to imply guilt from the defendant's complete silence or lack of
cooperation.” Id. at 148.
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Similarly, in State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 59-61 (2011), the Idaho Supreme
Court again found that it was prosecutorial misconduct for the prosecutor or an officer of
the State to comment on a defendant’s silence.  The prosecution asked, “so you did not
interview him?” Id. at 59.  The officer responded, “I attempted to.” Id.  The Court
mentioned that “the jury was likely to infer that the reason Sergeant Maskell only
‘attempted’ to interview Mr. Ellington rather than actually interviewing him was because
he chose to invoke his right to remain silent once he was put under arrest.” Id. at 61.
Again, the State was unable to prove the evidence was relevant or that it was offered for
any purpose other than to draw attention to Mr. Ellington’s assertion of his right to
remain silent. Id.  The Court noted that “when an officer of the State gives any
unsolicited testimony that is gratuitous and prejudicial to the defendant, that testimony
will be imputed to the State for the purposes of determining prosecutorial misconduct.”
Id.
Just as in the above case, the State drew prejudicial attention to Mr. Johnson’s
assertion of his right to remain silent through the presentation of Detective Snarr’s
testimony.  The State was unable to provide any reason to justify the testimony,
specifying it was offered to show how the investigation progressed, not for impeachment
purpsoes and stated “I’m struggling to come up with what’s there, but [sic] other than
providing you with what the alternative inferences could be other than to explain with
Detective Snarr was doing in his investigation . . .”  (Tr., p.734, Ls.21-25, p.729, Ls.6-7,
p.731, Ls.7-8.)  The district court found, “. . . the only way to read this statement . . . is a
direct comment on the defendant’s position that he wasn’t going to interview with the
detective, that he was going to have to talk to his attorney.”  (Tr., p.735, Ls.6-11.)
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Therefore, it is clear that the prosecution, whether the testimony was solicited or not,
offered evidence for the sole purpose of drawing an inference of guilt from
Mr. Johnson’s assertion of his constitutional right to remain silent.
As in Parker and Ellington, the misconduct in this case clearly violated
Mr. Johnson’s unwaived constitutional rights and deprived him of his right to a fair trial.
The State will be unable to prove that the inference of guilt derived from Mr. Johnson’s
silence did not contribute to the conviction.  As such, this Court must vacate the
conviction.
III.
The District Court Erred In Denying The Motion For A Mistrial After The Court
Erroneously Allowed Mr. Wilson To Testify With The Aid Of The Report, Despite The
Fact That His Memory Was Not Refreshed By The Contents Of A Report, And After
Finding That The State’s Failure To Disclose The Report Amounted To A Discovery
Violation
A. Introduction
The State presented the testimony of Scott Wilson, Mr. Johnson’s former
employer.  Mr. Wilson was asked specific questions about the hours Mr. Johnson
worked and the locations at which he was working on the days surrounding the
weekend that Mr. Johnson was alleged to have committed the charged offenses.
Although Mr. Wilson admitted to having no memories of the information, the district
court allowed Mr. Wilson to testify using a time entry report he had generated at the
request of the State to refresh his recollection.  The report was not disclosed to defense
counsel prior to Mr. Wilson producing it during his testimony.  Mr. Johnson asserts that
the district court abused its discretion in allowing Mr. Wilson to testify when his
recollection had not actually been refreshed, that the State committed a discovery
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violation that prejudiced Mr. Johnson’s ability to prepare for examination of Mr. Wilson,
and that the district court erred in denying the resulting motion for a mistrial.
B. Standard Of Review
Idaho’s appellate courts effectively review denials of motions for mistrial de novo.
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007). Error is harmless and not reversible if the
reviewing court is convinced “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of
did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010).
C. The District Court Erred In Denying The Motion For A Mistrial After The Court
Erroneously Allowed Mr. Wilson To Testify With The Aid Of A Report, Despite
The Fact That His Memory Was Not Refreshed By The Contents Of The Report,
And After Finding That The State’s Failure To Disclose The Report Amounted To
A Discovery Violation
1. Relevant Factual Information
Scott Wilson, Mr. Johnson’s former employer, employed Mr. Johnson for about
five years at Trilogy Network Systems.  (Tr., p.263, L.1 – p.624, L.14.)  The focus of
Mr. Wilson’s testimony was to provide information about certain dates that Mr. Johnson
worked near the time that he was alleged to have inappropriately touched A.J.
However, issues regarding Mr. Wilson’s ability to remember and testify to this
information became an issue early on in his testimony.
After discussing that work for a specific client, Pickett Equipment, required some
work to be completed in the office, Mr. Wilson was asked if he remembered if
Mr. Johnson was working on that particular job on March 19, 2004.  (Tr., p.627, L.8 –
p.628, L.6.)  Mr. Wilson requested that he be able to look at some notes.  (Tr., p.628,
L.10.)  After some discussion, it became clear that Mr. Wilson wanted to use a report he
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generated from a time tracking system called Bridge Track and that, because he was no
longer using that system, he had run a SQL query to pull information regarding the
dates in question.  (Tr., p.629, L.12 – p.631, L.6.)  Mr. Wilson stated that the report
would refresh his memory.  (Tr., p.631, Ls.7-9.)  Defense noted counsel they had filed a
discovery request and that the report had not been disclosed.  (Tr., p.631, Ls.12-17.)  In
follow-up, Mr. Wilson admitted that he did not remember seeing Mr. Johnson at work on
either March 19, 2004, or March 22, 2004.  (Tr., p.632, Ls.9-17.)  The district court
remarked that if “the witness’ memory is refreshed, then you can proceed, but no
testimony from the document itself.”  (Tr., p.632, Ls.22-24.)  Defense counsel then
requested that the jury be excused while the report was discussed.  (Tr., p.633, Ls.1-4.)
Mr. Wilson then discussed the time tracking program in more detail, admitted that
the raw invoices from which the tracking data was compiled had been destroyed, and
discussed how the report had been created.  (Tr., p.634, L.5 – p.636, L.18.)  Defense
counsel then brought up the discovery request; noted that if a summary is used, the
originals must be made available; and noted that this was “not recollection being
refreshed,” but “an attempt to put . . . data into evidence . . .” which had never been
disclosed in the seven years the case had been pending.  (Tr., p.637, Ls.2-13.)  After a
comment from the State that they were not putting on documentary evidence, the
district court noted that the witness could “testify without the benefit of the document,
because it’s very close to his testimony being from the document itself, which is an
authentication of the document, and it’s impermissible.  It’s late disclosed discovery.  [If
his recollection has been refreshed he can testify.]  But any further use of the document
will not be permitted.”  (Tr., p.637, L.19 – p.638, L.8.)  The district court continued:
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And his recollection was that he didn’t know, and then he produced
– he did a computer search.  He has indicated he still has not present
recollection.  You then asked him about this document, whether that
assisted him with refreshment of his recollection.  He can answer that
question, . . . but he cannot testify from the document . . . itself.
. . . [T]he purpose of the document would simply be, if it does, to
refresh his recollection, and that’s the foundation that has to be explored
and can be explored on cross-examination as well, but further use of the
document is very problematic due to its nondisclosure and due to the fact
that it has now been sufficiently referenced to the jury that there’s some
possible hint in the jury’s mind that it is itself evidence.
(Tr., p.638, L.20 – p.639, L.18.)
The jury returned and Mr. Wilson was asked if his memory had been refreshed
as to Mr. Johnson’s work on March 19th; he stated it was refreshed.  (Tr., p.640, L.22 –
p.641, L.1.)  The State continued to ask him about Mr. Johnson’s work on March 19th
and then questioning turned to March 22nd.  (Tr., p.641, Ls.2-20.)  When asked how he
remembered that Mr. Johnson worked for him on March 22nd, Mr. Wilson responded
that he had “the hours that he turned in for that day.”  (Tr., p.641, Ls.21-23.)  Defense
counsel objected again noting that Mr. Wilson’s memory had not been refreshed, but
that he was testifying from his memory of the report he generated earlier in the day.
(Tr., p.641, L.24 – p.642, L.3.)  The State again attempted to prove that Mr. Wilson’s
recollection had been refreshed through a series of questions:
Q.  . . . Has your memory been refreshed on whether or not
Mr. Johnson worked for you on March 22nd, 2004?
A.  What do you mean my refreshed?
Q.  Have you – Do you, in fact, know at one point in time whether or
not Mr. Johnson worked for you on March 22nd, 2004?
A.  Yes.
40
Q.  Has your memory been refreshed since that time whether or not
you have knowledge of whether or not he worked for you on March 22nd,
2004?
A.  Yes.
Q.  Do you recall if Mr. Johnson worked for you on March 22nd,
2004?
A.  Yes.
(Tr., p.642, L.14 – p.643, L.3.)
Defense counsel was then allowed to voir dire in aid of objection:
Q.  Mr. Wilson, if I can make a distinction here.  I know that you
have records or you had records for your business, that you can go back
and verify certain kinds of things.  You can see whether or not there is
what we sometimes call a paper trail; correct?
A.  That’s correct.
Q.  There’s also such a thing as a recollection.  Can you remember
the 19th day of March 2004?
A.  No.
Q.  Can you remember whether you were in the office that day?
A.  No.
Q.  So you can’t remember whether Mr. Johnson was present in the
office that day?
A.  Not from recollection.
Q.  And  as  far  as  the  22nd of March is concerned, you have no
recollection of your own as to whether he was there on that day; correct?
A.  That’s correct.
(Tr., p.643, L.14 – p.644, L.9.)  Defense counsel then noted his objection and requested
the testimony be stricken.  (Tr., p.644, Ls.10-11.)  The district court overruled the
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objection.  (Tr., p.644, Ls.17-18.)  Mr. Wilson was then allowed to testify about
Mr. Johnson’s work on March 22nd.  (Tr., p.644, L.23 – p.645, L.20.)
During his testimony, the prosecution requested a short break to retrieve a
document.  (Tr., p.647, Ls.5-20.)  Before the jury returned, defense counsel asked to be
allowed to make a record.  (Tr., p.648, Ls.5-6.)  He reiterated that a discovery request
had been made over a year ago, no records representing the data management
program used by Trilogy were provided, Mr. Wilson has no current relocation of what
happened on March 19th or 22nd, the defense has had no opportunity to review the
records related to tracking Mr. Johnson’s work, that the State was using a “backdoor
approach to introducing documentary evidence that was never disclosed to the
defense,” that the defense had “been caught in unawares,” and that the district court’s
incorrect ruling amounted reversible error.  (Tr., p.648, L.8 – p.651, L.17.)
The district court determined that it needed further information and had
Mr. Wilson return to the witness stand.  (Tr., p.655, L.23 – p.656, L.5.)  The court
questioned Mr. Wilson:
As I recall yesterday, tentatively you were scheduled to testify in the
afternoon.  I believe it was represented to me that you did come to court
that date – or at that time but that you had a need to return to Twin Falls,
and, thus, we adjourned early yesterday to permit you to do that.
So my question to you is twofold.  Was the purpose of returning to
Twin Falls to obtain this inquiry document that you’ve used to refresh
recollection with, and, if it was, was the production of that document
something that you initiated on your own or was this at the request or
suggestion or encouragement of anybody involved in this case?
The Witness:  The production of the document was on my own.  I
was asked to try to verify what Mr. Johnson was doing on March 22nd.
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The Court:  All right.  And the question to try to you [sic] verify what
Mr. Johnson was doing was propounded to you by someone from the
State’s side of this case?
The Witness:  Yes.  More just to refresh my memory on what he
was doing that day.
The Court:  And approximately when was that inquiry or request
made?
The Witness:  It was sometime yesterday afternoon.  Probably
sometime around 3:00 to 3:30.
The Court:  And at that point as you thought about that, you came
upon the idea that you could conduct this search through your computer
records to obtain that information; is that correct?
The Witness: That’s correct.
The Court:  And then you did do that?
The Witness:  Yes.
(Tr., p.656, L.9 – p.657, L.18.)  The court then allowed counsel to do further inquiry.
Defense counsel asked:
Q.  Mr. Wilson, who was this conversation with, the conversation
yesterday afternoon?
A.  It was with either Lance or Eric.  I don’t recall which one.
. . .
Q.  I understand.  But you were asked if there was some way you
could go back to the office or go back to Twin Falls and verify whether he
worked on those days or did not?
A.  That’s correct.
Q.  And to verify, in fact, whether he was working on this Pickett
contract as well; correct?
A.  I don’t know that we discussed the Pickett one specifically, just
what – whether he was in Twin Falls on that day was more what the
question was.
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Q.  And you told them that you thought there was such a way or
such a thing you could do?
A.  I don’t remember if I said that or not.
Q.  And, in fact, you produced such document; correct?
A.  Yeah.
Q.  And when did you tell the State that you had produced that
document?
A.  I mentioned it when I came to court this morning that I had
information on what Mr. Johnsons was doing on March 22nd.
Q.  So you came here yesterday prepared to testify?
A.  Yes.
Q.  And had you testified yesterday, you could not of your own
recollection have testified anything about whether or not Mr. Johnson
worked on the 19th of March 2004?
A.  That’s not correct.  I did know what he was doing on March 19th
yesterday.  I did not know what he was doing on March 22nd.
Q.  So you would not have been able to testify about March 22nd
from present recollection at all?
A.  That’s correct.
Q.  And how did you know what he was doing on the 19th?
A.  Because I looked in those records earlier and determined that.
Q.  When?
A.  It was probably a week ago.
Q.  After you, again, had talked to the prosecutors about your –
A.  Yes.
(Tr., p.658, L.14 – p.660, L.20.)  The prosecution then confirmed that it had asked
Mr. Wilson if he knew what Mr. Johnson was doing on the dates in question and had
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confirmed that he could obtain that information.  (Tr., p.661, Ls.2-19.)  After the State
was done questioning him, Mr. Wilson volunteered, “In fact, if I can add to that, I
specifically asked you yesterday if you wanted me to print off a report, and you said,
‘No.  Just look at it and see what you can determine.’”  (Tr., p.661, Ls.21-24.)
The district court then asked defense counsel what remedy it was seeking.
(Tr. p.662, Ls.15-18.)  Defense counsel then noted, “I don’t think there is now a remedy.
I think what we would be asking the jury to do is to unremember testimony that they
have heard, and that’s my problem.  And we have no practical way of examining the
primary records from which this document was generated in a meaningful way.”
(Tr., p.662, Ls.19-25.)  Eventually, after discussing the importance of Mr. Wilson’s
testimony, defense counsel made a motion for a mistrial.  (Tr., p.668, Ls.2-4.)  The
district court noted that, “The more difficult question and the more troubling question for
me is that this information was generated just in the last few days, not disclosed to the
defense.  If it has the relevancy and the power that the State says that it does, that
actually increases the concern that I’ve got about this particular information.”
(Tr., p.668, Ls.15-21.)
Following a recess and still outside the presence of jury, the State presented the
testimony of Kim Bourn, a legal secretary for the prosecutor’s office.  (Tr., p.671, L.14 –
p.672, L.5.)  Ms. Bourn had been a participant in the conversation regarding the printing
of the Trilogy records and noted that Mr. Wilson had been told, ‘“Well, if you can’t print it
off, don’t worry about it.”’  (Tr., p.672, Ls.6-20.)
The district court then ruled on the pending motions.  The court noted that it was
making its rulings based on the idea that Mr. Wilson’s testimony about March 19th and
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22nd was either corroborative of Michelle Johnson’s testimony or direct evidence in
support of the State’s theory that the charged conduct occurred on or around those
dates.  (Tr., p.676, Ls.1-12.)  The district court stated that it was “difficult, if not
impossible,” to rein in Mr. Wilson’s testimony at this point.  (Tr., p.676, Ls.13-17.)  The
court ruled that it would affirm the prior ruling on refreshing recollection, “I think the
State did just provide sufficient foundation to satisfy the requirements of Rule 612 for
use of that document.”  (Tr., p.676, L.18 – p.677, L.1.)  The district court also found that
the failure to disclose the report constituted a discovery violation “in form, if not in
substance” because, by the witnesses testimony, the report “was requested by either
the State’s attorney or Detective Snarr.”  (Tr., p.677, Ls.3-11.)  However, the court took
the motion for mistrial under advisement noting that there was no possibility of excluding
the testimony at this point and that it needed to hear further testimony to determine if
the evidence deprived Mr. Johnson of a fair trial.  (Tr., p.677, L.18 – p.678, L.25.)  The
court then offered defense counsel an opportunity to examine Mr. Wilson’s records,
continue with the trial and re-call him at a later time, but noted that it was “reluctant to
have this trial go on forever” and “reluctant to have the jury continue to be out for long
periods of time.”  (Tr., p.679, Ls.7-14, p.680 Ls.8-17.)
Defense counsel told the district court that allowing them to look at the records
and report would not be feasible at this point in time.  He noted that he was staying in a
hotel, was not a computer expert, that there was no time to conduct further examination
of the time reporting system, and that there would not be enough time to sift through the
information especially while continuing with trial.  (Tr., p.680, L.18 – p.681, L.24.)
Counsel reminded the district court that:
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And, again, I have a document that I now have to deal with
because I believe that the document, in effect, is in evidence.  The jury
has heard not just that Mr. Johnson was present at work on those days.
They’ve heard how many hours he was there on those days.  So I them
am forced to cross examine a witness based upon a document that I did
not see until the witness himself was actually testifying and the primary
source of which I have had no opportunity to investigate.  I’m going to
have to do that, but I think that has put me at a very large disadvantage.  I
think it flies in the face of what Rule 16 is supposed to do.
(Tr., p.681, L.25 – p.682, L.12.)
The district court then again offered to stop Mr. Wilson’s testimony and have him
come back at a later date.  (Tr., p.683, Ls.4-25.)  Defense counsel again turned down
the offer noting that, “I am simply not able to conduct investigation and further discovery
inquiry during the course of a trial.  And what the Court is suggesting – I mean, if we
had just learned about this even last week, I think what the Court is suggesting would
have been viable.  It’s not now.  So I appreciate the opportunity, but I don’t view it as
being of comfort or assistance to the defense.”  (Tr., p.684, Ls.6-15.)
Mr. Wilson’s testimony continued and on cross-examination it again highlighted
that the report did not actually refresh his recollection:
Q.  Again, good morning, Mr. Wilson.  I don’t want to make too fine
of a point of this because sometime lawyers start talking in a language
that is absurd.  Mr. Wilson, but what I’m trying to do here just simply as I
can is distinguish between those things that you remember without having
to look at any other document or photograph and those things that you
could only remember if you had the aid of some other refreshing object
like a photograph.  Does that make sense to you, sir?
A.  Yes.
. . .
Q.  You don’t remember whether you personally saw Mr. Johnson
at the offices of Trilogy on that day, do you?
A.  No, I don’t.
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Q.  And you don’t know whether or not you saw any other
employee on that particular day; correct?
A.  That’s correct.
Q.  And for that matter, you could not say with certainty that you
even came to the office on the 19th of March 2004?
A.  No.
Q.  Okay.  But you were able to go back to a database that tracked,
as I understand it, the billings that you would send out to various clients?
A.  Yes.
Q.  And this would be in the nature of a time and billing program?
A.  Yes, it is.
. . .
Q.  And that, in fact, is the program that you consulted, you say, to
refresh your recollection?
A.  Yes.
Q.  But consulting that program and the data that was contained in
the program didn’t give you a present recollection of seeing David
Johnson in the office on the 19th of March, did it?
A.  No.
Q.  Nor did it give you a recollection – a present recollection of
seeing him in the office on the 22nd of March; correct?
A.  That’s correct.
Q.  You are assuming that the data entry is accurate.  And that’s
what you’re relying upon, the data entry, not any memory that you have
personally.
A.  Yes, that’s correct.
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(Tr., p.693, L.2 – p.695, L.21.)  Mr. Wilson also noted that he did not enter the time
entries, but that they were completed by either the secretary or chief financial officer.
(Tr., p.695, L.22 – p.696, L.18.)
After the State rested, defense counsel requested that the district court rule on
the motions for mistrial.  (Tr., p.1070, Ls.25-25, p.1084, Ls.12-13.)  The district court
denied the motion for mistrial.  (Tr., p.1084, L.14 – p.1085, L.6.)
2. The Report Was Improperly Used During Mr. Wilson’s Testimony Because
It Did Not Refresh His Recollection
Idaho appellate courts apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a
lower court’s decision to either admit or exclude evidence. State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho
584, 590 (2013) (quoting White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 888 (2004).)  Furthermore, “‘A
trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) recognizes the issue as one of discretion,
(2) acts within the boundaries of its discretion and applies the applicable legal
standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise of reason.’” Id.  (quoting
Fazzio v. Mason, 150 Idaho 591, 594 (2011).)
Idaho Rule of Evidence 612 provides that a witness may use a writing or object
to refresh his or her memory. Baker v. Boren, 129 Idaho 885, 892 (Ct. App. 1997);
I.R.E. 612.  However, “[i]t is error to allow a witness to testify at trial from prepared notes
under the guise of refreshing recollection.” Baker, 129 Idaho at 885; Hall v. American
Bakeries Co., 873 F.2d 1133 (8th Cir.1989).  Two articles of foundation must be laid
before a witness may refer materials to refresh his or her memory. Id. First, the witness
must demonstrate the need to refresh his or her memory and, second, the witness must
confirm that the materials will assist in refreshing his or her recollection. Id.  A witness
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may not testify directly from the notes, but may use them to assist in recollection. Id.
“The court must ensure that the witness actually has a present recollection and is not to
allow inadmissible evidence to inadvertently slip in for its truth.” Id. (citing 20th Century
Wear, Inc., v. Sanmark–Stardust, Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 93 n. 17 (2d Cir.1984)).
In the case at hand, the district court abused its discretion when it failed to reach
its decision through an exercise of reason.  Contrary to the district court’s decision
otherwise, Mr. Wilson’s memory was not refreshed by the report he used and his
testimony, on this topic, was inadmissible.  Mr. Wilson was able to recall that
Mr. Johnson had worked for him during the month of March, including the dates in
question.  (Tr., p.642, L.14 – p.643, L.3.)  However, Mr. Wilson admitted that he relied
completely on his notes to determine whether Mr. Johnson was at work on the dates in
question, what he was working on, and the hours that he worked on those dates, as he
had no specific memory of that information.  (Tr., p.643, L.14 – p.644, L.9.)  Mr. Wilson
again admitted that he had no memory of the relevant information on cross-
examination.  (Tr., p.693, L.2 – p.695, L.21.)  Further, Mr. Wilson’s testimony showed
that he may have actually never had knowledge of the specific times that Mr. Johnson
worked because he did not make time entries into the timekeeping program, but that
they were completed by either the secretary or chief financial officer.   (Tr., p.695, L.22 –
p.696, L.18.)
As such, the State failed to meet the foundational requirements for Mr. Wilson to
use of the report because the materials did not assist in refreshing his memory.
Regardless of Mr. Wilson’s actual memories, the jury was allowed to hear specific
testimony about dates, times, and the locations that Mr. Johnson worked during the
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dates in question.  The district court abused its discretion in allowing the testimony,
which was not admissible recollection refreshed, but inadmissible evidence presented
“under the guise of refreshing recollection.”   Mr. Wilson’s testimony regarding the dates
of March 19th and March 22nd was improperly admitted and constitutes grounds for
reversal.
The State will be unable to prove that the improperly presented evidence did not
contribute to the conviction.  As such, this Court must vacate the conviction.
3. The State Committed A Discovery Violation When It Failed To Provide
Defense Counsel A Copy Of Mr. Wilson’s Time Entry Report
Further, the evidence and the materials used to “refresh the recollection” of
Mr. Wilson were intertwined with the State’s discovery violation.  As noted above,
Mr. Wilson testified that the prosecution had specifically told him to look up the time
entry information. (Tr., p.661, Ls.21-24.)  The district court noted that, “[t]he . . . more
troubling question for me is that this information was generated just in the last few days,
not disclosed to the defense.  If it has the relevancy and the power that the State says
that it does, that actually increases the concern that I’ve got about this particular
information.”  (Tr., p.668, Ls.15-21.)  Later the court found that the failure to disclose the
report constituted a discovery violation.  (Tr., p.677, Ls.3-11.)
The prejudicial nature of Mr. Wilson’s improperly admitted testimony was
amplified by the State’s discovery violation which deprived defense counsel of the
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opportunity to properly prepare for Mr. Wilson’s testimony.11  The district court offered to
continue with the trial, but delay Mr. Wilson’s testimony to give defense counsel time to
examine Mr. Wilson’s records.  (Tr., p.679, Ls.7-14, p.680 Ls.8-17.)  The district court
did not offer a continuance.  (Tr., p.679, Ls.7-14.)  Defense counsel noted that his
remedy for the discovery violation was insufficient because it was not realistically
possible for counsel to conduct an examination of the time reporting system and sift
through the information while continuing with trial.  (Tr., p.680, L.18 – p.681, L.24,
p.684, Ls.6-15.)  Counsel expressed concern that he was now “forced to cross examine
a witness based upon a document that I did not see until the witness himself was
actually testifying and the primary source of which I have had no opportunity to
investigate.  I’m going to have to do that, but I think that has put me at a very large
disadvantage.”  (Tr., p.682, Ls.5-11.)
 As defense counsel suggested, the only appropriate remedy was a mistrial.
(Tr., p.668, Ls.2-4.)
4. The District Court Erred In Denying The Motion For Mistrial
Mr. Johnson asserts that the district court erred in denying the motion for mistrial
11 Mr. Johnson asserts that I.R.E. 612 also supports defense counsel’s request that the
relevant testimony of Mr. Wilson be struck or a mistrial granted. Idaho Rule of Evidence
612 notes that if a witness uses a writing to refresh their memory for the purposes of
testifying an adverse party may be entitled to have the writing prior to the witness
testifying.  I.R.E. 612(b).  Further, if   “a writing or object is not produced, made available
for inspection, or delivered pursuant to order under this rule, the court shall make any
order justice requires, except that in criminal cases when the prosecution elects not to
comply, the order shall be one striking the testimony or, if the court in its discretion
determines that the interests of justice so require, declaring a mistrial.”  I.R.E. 612(c).
However, no request for this particular I.R.E. 612 relief was made during the trial and,
as such, it is not specifically addressed as a ground for relief in this appeal.
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because the erroneously admitted testimony of Mr. Wilson and defense counsel’s
inability to properly prepare for Mr. Wilson’s testimony due to the discovery violation
deprived him of a fair trial.  A motion for a mistrial is controlled by I.C.R. 29.1, which
provides that “[a] mistrial may be declared upon motion of the defendant, when there
occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or
outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant
of a fair trial.”  I.C.R. 29.1(a); State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 389 (Ct. App. 1996).
The primary purpose of Mr. Wilson’s testimony was to show that Mr. Johnson
had an opportunity to commit the crimes charged.  According to Michelle Johnson,
Mr. Johnson was alone with A.J. and the only time he had the opportunity to commit the
instant offenses was between the afternoon of March 19, 2004, and March 22, 2004.
(Tr., p.907, L.21 – p.918, L.5.)  Thus, detailed information regarding Mr. Johnson’s work
schedule which corroborated Ms. Johnson’s testimony was critically important and
extremely prejudicial.  This evidence bolstered the credibility of Ms. Johnson, one of the
State’s most crucial witnesses.  Mr. Johnson acknowledges that State’s Exhibit U,
Mr. Johnson’s personal work calendar, provides some general information regarding his
work schedule; however, it did not provide the same detailed information and does not
alleviate the harm caused by allowing Mr. Wilson’s erroneous testimony.
Further, the prejudicial nature of the improperly admitted testimony was
intensified by the State’s related discovery violation which limited Mr. Johnson’s ability
to be fully prepared for and to confront Mr. Wilson as a witness.  See supra.
There is a great danger that the improper testimony and related discovery
violation had a continuing impact on the trial and the jurors’ ultimate decision in the
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case.  As such, these errors deprived Mr. Johnson of a fair trial and it was error for the
district court to not declare a mistrial.
IV.
Even If The Above Errors Are Individually Harmless, Mr. Johnson’s Fourteenth
Amendment Right To Due Process Of Law Was Violated Because The Accumulation Of
Errors Deprived Him Of His Right To A Fair Trial
Mr. Johnson asserts that if the Court finds that the above errors were harmless,
the district court’s errors combined amount to cumulative error.  The cumulative error
doctrine refers to an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be
harmless, but when aggregated, show the absence of a fair trial in contravention of the
defendant’s constitutional right to due process. State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 629, 635
(Ct. App. 2002).  In order to find cumulative error, this Court must first conclude that
there is merit to more than one of the alleged errors and then conclude that these
errors, when aggregated, denied the defendant a fair trial. State v. Lovelass, 133 Idaho
160, 171 (Ct. App. 1999).  Under that doctrine, even when individual errors are deemed
harmless, an accumulation of such errors may deprive a defendant of a fair trial.
State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453 (1994).  However, a finding of cumulative error
must be predicated upon an accumulation of actual errors. State v. Medina, 128 Idaho
19, 29 (Ct. App. 1996).
Mr. Johnson asserts that the district court’s errors amounted to actual errors
depriving him of a fair trial.  His arguments in support of this assertion are found in




Mr. Johnson respectfully requests that his judgments of conviction be vacated
and his case remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this 28th day of March, 2017.
___________/s/______________
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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